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Although interest in literary theory has prompted much discussion 
concerning the relationship between literature and religious 
worldview, that discussion has taken place primarily among theorists 
and not practitioners. Christian writers have few  contemporary 
models by which to note integration o f  what one confesses and what 
one creates. John Gardner, whose On m oral fic tion  created a 
firestorm  a decade ago in North America, offers a view o f  fiction  
which places significant emphasis on a fundam ental assertion about 
the nature o f  humanity, specifically that men and women are choice- 
makers. The framework fo r  this view o f  the human condition and his 
view o f  the role o f  story in our lives, as well as the life o f  the writer, 
is o f  substantial help in visualizing what we are about as Christian 
fiction writers.
1. Introduction
I cannot begin to count the hours I have spent writing in the last 18 years. I 
have started several novels, completed three; written full-length plays, several 
books o f  devotional readings, a book o f journalistic portraits, three books of 
short fiction, maybe 75 short stories and a couple dozen essays. I have begun a 
score o f other things that never made it. But after all that work, I find myself 
no closer to grasping a full intellectual understanding o f what it means to be a 
Christian writer than I was 18 years ago, when I started a novel as a means of 
teaching myself to write.
1 Reworked version of a paper delivered at the International Conference on 
“Christianity and literature at the turn of the twentieth century”, held at 
Potchefstroom, August 1995.
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I believe in God. I worship him, and I write. Just exactly how my faith and my 
work are related still remains a mystery. My own fiction illustrates my own 
confusion, I suppose. A few years ago a New York agent said this about my 
work:
I feel the strong, religious tenor of the work would make the collection more 
salable to a [religious publisher]. The problem with religious publishers is 
that they find it difficult to publish any work that might offend any [emphasis 
his] of their readers, and it’s nearly impossible to tell the truth without 
offending someone in the congregation.
I understand the difference between aesthetic questions, and sociological or 
ecclesiastical questions. I know that the use o f  profanity and vulgarity, or 
depicting sexuality in a work o f  fiction may offend readers with whom I 
regularly worship. But I believe that problem is not so much an aesthetic 
problem as it is a sociological, ecclesiastical, or, if  you will, even a family 
problem.
Such problems are worthy o f  exploration, but what I wish to address are the 
questions that pertain to the work o f  writing fiction, not those which arise from 
our reaction to it. The question that plagues me is this: what is the shape of 
fiction which glorifies God? What should such fiction look like?
Years ago already, I stumbled on the work o f  the late John Gardner, a fiction 
writer and academic, whose principal work created significant controversy in 
the North American literary world more than a decade ago. What under­
standing I have o f  what it means to be a Christian writer is based largely on 
John Gardner’s ideas. His work is central to what 1 see as the task o f  a 
Christian writer; furthermore, among writers at least, it remains at the centre of 
any North American discussion o f  “morality” in fiction, or the purpose of 
literature, when in this post-modernist academic climate such questions are 
even raised.
2. “a stranger comes to town” / “a man goes on a trip”
I met John Gardner at the 1980 Bread Loaf W riters’ Conference, where he was 
one o f  the featured writers, and where he explained the two basic plot forms 
into which he felt most novels and short stories could be divided. In the first 
form, one he characterized as “a stranger comes to town” , the action o f the 
story is initiated by an outsider. In such stories, the protagonist and reader 
stand as spectators before the driving force o f  the story -  the stranger, that force 
about which we know significantly less.
The second form, one he characterized as “a man goes on a trip” , works in an 
opposite fashion: the main character’s quest initiates the action. In this story,
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readers know the nature o f the protagonist’s desire or goals, and the story’s 
suspense results (torn the pursuit o f  those goals.
Most stories, Gardner claimed, fit into one o f  those two forms. But the second, 
he argued, was the superior form since only in that type o f  story is the reader 
able to empathize with the character and his or her quest.
What I would like to do is to present Gardner’s view o f the function o f literature 
as a model, and in the process define more ftilly the nature o f  the difference he 
drew between those two plot forms by showing that the basis for his claims goes 
to the very roots o f  his view of fiction, a view he has set down most clearly in 
his very controversial On Moral Fiction (1978), and in two later volumes on the 
craft o f  fiction, On Becoming a Novelist (1983) and The Art o f  Fiction (1984). 
In explaining Gardner’s view, I intend also to lay out a view o f writing which I 
believe to be as close to a “Christian” view o f fiction as any I have ever 
encountered.
3. Gardner’s view of literature
It is important that we see Gardner’s distinctions as emanating from character 
and not plot, however. These two story-types are less “story-types” than they 
are “character-types.” According to Gardner, character, “the very life of 
fiction”, is the animating force in any story, especially when the protagonist has 
an identifiable motivation for action, when he is “a man going on a trip” . “I 
think in a good book or movie,” he says in an interview, “you present people 
struggling heroically for what they value, and the reader’s natural response to a 
well-written story about someone heroically struggling for what he believes to 
be good ends, the reader sympathizes with that character and wants to be like 
that character...” (Mendez-Egle, 1983:102).
Suspense, he claims, is created when that heroic struggle encounters obstacles; 
suspense originates in what he calls elsewhere the protagonist’s “driving force”: 
“Suspense, rightly understood, is a serious business: one presents the moral 
problem -  the character’s admirable or unadmirable intent and the pressures of 
a situation working for and against him” (On Moral F ictionA H ). The key 
word here is intent; Gardner wants his readers to see that protagonists must 
have purpose or drive -  that is, they must be characters going on a journey, not 
those who passively receive action created by someone or something else.
The kind of suspense 1 am interested in is that which arises when the reader 
is given all the information, good solid information. He knows what the 
character’s problem is and what his goal is and what the opposition is and the 
suspense is, what will he do, what will happen to him if he does that, what 
will she say, etc. (Mendez-Egle, 1983:98).
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In On moral fiction  he explains how he wrote his novel October Light, and in 
the process shows us the same kind o f  cause or force animating his own 
protagonist. Clearly, the character he describes fits the “a man going on a trip” 
pattern:
One begins a work of fiction with certain clear opinions -  for instance, I 
myself in a recent novel, October Light, began with the opinion that 
traditional New England values are the values we should live by: good 
workmanship, independence, unswerving honesty, and so on -  and one tests 
those opinions in lifelike situations, puts them under every kind of pressure 
one can think of, always being fair to the other side ... (Gardner, 1978:114).
If we rephrase the Bread Loaf distinctions, we may see the lines he has drawn 
more clearly. He is talking in the first instance (“a stranger comes to town”) 
about characters (the town itself) who are acted upon, recipients o f  the action of 
the novel. On the other hand, when he speaks o f  the second type (“a man goes 
on a trip”), he is describing characters who have purpose or “driving motive”. 
Good fiction -  that is, fiction people enjoy -  features characters who act, not 
characters who are simply acted upon.
But what makes active characters superior to passive characters? The answer 
lies in a value judgm ent which Gardner makes in On Moral Fiction.
3.1 Moral fiction
What Gardner meant by “moral fiction”, has little to do with happy endings or 
the triumph o f good over evil. Gardner begins the second chapter o f  that book 
by warning against such misplaced notions: “By ‘m oral’ I do not mean some 
such timid evasion as ‘Not too blatantly //wmoral.’” Furthermore, he does not 
mean “that art should hold up cheap or comball models o f  behavior” : “I do not 
mean, either, that what the world needs is didactic art. Didacticism and true art 
are immiscible; and in any case, nothing guarantees that didacticism will be 
moral” (Gardner, 1978:18-19).
What Gardner does mean with the use o f  the word moral has more to do with 
the means by which art is created as the ends it accomplishes. “The morality of 
art is, as I’ve said, far less a matter o f  doctrine than o f process,” he says later in 
the book. “Art is the means by which an artist comes to see: it is his peculiar, 
highly sophisticated and extremely demanding technique o f  discovery” 
(Gardner, 1978:91). Artists, he says, rely on imagination as a test o f  truth. 
When the writer works, all the information and experience she has is filtered 
through the imagination to create, in an evolutionary manner, the life o f the 
character. Throughout the process o f  writing a novel, the writer asks questions 
and makes judgments based on his discoveries, and the result is a process by
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which both writer and reader make order out o f  chaos. At work, the writer’s 
imagination links him with the imagination o f the reader, a theory is rooted in 
the Romantic belief that the artist’s imagination touches some line o f  shared 
intuition in all o f us. When the artist’s vision fails to reach that deep base of 
what Faulkner called “the eternal verities”, then the survival o f his work cannot 
be assured, even though he may attain critical success.
Gardner (1978:16) makes a claim for this notion o f the understanding reached 
by the reader in “moral fiction”, when he says that “fiction is thus a convincing 
and honest but unverifiable science (in the old sense, knowledge)”. It is 
unverifiable because “it depends on the reader’s sensitivity and clear sense of 
how things are, a sense for which we have no tests”.
A protagonist with an idea worth advocating or a cause worth following, even if  
that cause has meaning only for himself, encounters a series o f obstacles which 
likely force him to adjust his values or change; that process will bring him to a 
more comprehensive understanding of him self and his predicament. This 
pattern -  a series o f  adjustments, forward then backward then forward again -  
is the same pattern by which writers create fiction, Gardner says. Thus, fiction 
is a unique means by which both writer and reader come to understand 
themselves and their values. When the protagonist’s quest, through the writer’s 
creative process, strikes a resonant chord with the reader’s imaginative sense, 
the fiction is “moral” : “True art is by its nature moral. We recognize true art 
by its careful, thoroughly honest search for and analysis o f  values” (Gardner, 
1978:19).
The result o f such “morality” in the process o f  writing is fiction which is life- 
giving, both in the means by which character is created and in the effects it 
creates in the readers. “I have claimed,” Gardner says, “that art is essentially 
and primarily moral -  that is life-giving -  moral in its process o f  creation and 
moral in what it says” (Gardner, 1978:15). A few pages later, he returns to the 
idea: “No one seriously doubts, surely, that Tolstoy’s essential argument is 
right: ideals expressed in art can effect [sic] behavior in the world, at least in 
some o f the people some o f the time” (Gardner, 1978:27).
Yet, art’s potential for positive effect on public morality is not predicated on 
what it “teaches” us, but instead on the “morality” o f  its creation. “I agree with 
Tolstoy,” he says, “that the highest purpose o f  art is to make people good by 
choice” (Gardner, 1978:106). Here again, the emphasis is upon “choice” . In 
the same way that the writer exercises options for the characters and creates 
plots through the reliability o f  her own imagination, the reader feels the 
possibilities o f  those choices, and that effect, he says, is “life-giving” and 
“moral”, art’s moral gift to man.
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“Moral fiction”, then, is that which allows readers to make choices about the 
values in their lives. “True art,” he claims, “by specific technical means now 
commonly forgotten, clarities life, establishes models o f human action, casts 
nets toward the future, carefully judges our right and wrong directions, 
celebrates and mourns” (Gardner, 1978:100).
Perhaps the clearest example o f  what Gardner assumes to be “moral fiction” 
occurs in On Becoming a Novelist (1983), in a section in which Gardner creates 
a plot and characters to aid young writers in understanding what happens in the 
process o f  writing. The imagined characters, named Frank and Wanda, are a 
father and a daughter who, unaware o f  their familial relationship, happen to 
live as neighbours. Gardner creates a situation in which Wanda begins to feel 
sexual attraction for Frank. He then goes on to describe the possibilities for the 
characters and the story:
If Frank is clearly drawn and interesting, a lifelike human being, the reader 
worries about him, understands him, cares about the choices he makes. Thus 
if Frank at some point, out of cowardice and indecisiveness, makes a choice 
any decent human being would recognize as wrong, the reader will feel 
vicarious embarrassment and shame, as he would feel if some loved one, or 
the reader himself, were to make such a choice. If Frank sooner or later acts 
bravely, or at least honestly, selflessly, the reader will feel a thrill of pride as 
if he himself or some loved one had behaved well -  a pride that ultimately 
expresses pleasure in what is best not just in the made-up character but in all 
humankind. If Frank finally behaves well, and Wanda show unexpected (but 
not arbitrary or writer-manipulated) nobility, the reader will feel even better.
This is the morality of fiction. The morality of the story of Frank and Wanda 
does not reside in their choosing not to commit incest or in their deciding 
they will commit incest. Good fiction does not deal in codes of conduct -  at 
least not directly; it affirms responsible humanness (Gardner, 1983:49-50).
3.2 Responsible humanness
What he argues for, then, is “responsible humanness”, and what that phrase 
seems to mean is that characters be endowed with the opportunity o f real choice 
in their lives. Characters who have choices about themselves and their 
relationship to the world are the ones, he would say, who are most human. 
When we understand this belief, we can see why Gardner regards characters 
who have no choices (as in “a stranger comes to town”) as less human than 
those characters whose attitudes or goals give them something to carry into the 
press o f  life. Characters who lack free will are passive characters, victims of 
powers greater than themselves. Thus, they are characters who lack the 
morality o f  choice. To Gardner, such characters not only carry less potential
John Gardner and the morality o f  choice
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for our sympathies as readers; they are simply less human, since true 
humanness means having the opportunity to make choices.
If Gardner is correct, one cannot help but ask why so many writers insist on 
creating characters who lack the humanness o f choice? Or, if  we use the Bread 
Loaf distinctions, why aren’t more writers creating the “man goes on a trip” 
characters?
The answer lies at least partially in Gardner’s assessment o f  the temper o f our 
times. He points out that characters who lack free will are simply in vogue 
today. “We have seen since World War II,” he says in On Becoming a 
Novelist, “all over the world, a rise o f  nonprofluence (actions leading nowhere, 
as in the plays o f Samuel Beckett) and unended fiction (as in John Fowles’ The 
French Lieutenant's Woman)” (Gardner, 1983:84).
But why are such styles popular? Gardner says we have reached a period 
characterized by intense groping for new forms and modes o f art. This search 
is occurring and is observable in many fields, by such related phenomena as a 
de-emphasis on melody in modem music, on plot in the modem novel, and on 
identifiable image in photography (Gardner, 1983:10). Art’s continuous search 
for new insight necessitates innovation in form. Today, he says, fiction writers, 
like musicians or sculptors, are abandoning old forms in hopes o f discovering 
new opportunities elsewhere.
He argues that such searches do little more than uncover some things left 
abandoned in the past, however. His call for “moral fiction,” he would say (like 
his assertion that “good” literature has characters who act and make choices), is 
an attempt to refurbish an old verity -  “art is as original and important as it is 
precisely because it does not start out with clear knowledge o f  what it means to 
say” (Gardner, 1983:13). It proceeds instead, powered by the imagination, by 
the writer’s making choices in the veiy flow o f the process o f  composition, 
choices which become embodied in character and thereby serve to affirm life 
itself by verifying diat all human beings can and do make such choices.
One o f the reasons Gardner’s idea o f “moral fiction” incited such controversy 
when his book appeared is, quite likely, that affirming his ideas about character 
in fiction necessitates a belief in man’s free will -  a leap o f faith which some 
writers and editors may be reluctant to take. Why? Again, because doubt is, he 
claims, part o f  the marrow o f our culture. The effect o f doubt is crippling, he 
says, since it renders us unable to make any judgments and leaves us in a moral 
vacuum: “If  we are unable to distinguish between true morality -  life- 
affirming, just, and compassionate behavior -  and statistics (the all but hopeless 
situation o f  most o f  humanity) or worse, trivial moral fashion, we begin to 
doubt morality itse lf’ (Gardner, 1983). Such confusion results, he says, in
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Normal M ailer’s hailing Charles Manson as “intellectually courageous, ... for 
the brave pursuit o f truth changes utterly when truth becomes whim. The man 
so infected may begin to feel guilty chiefly for possessing a moral code at all. 
Confusion and doubt become the primary civilized emotions” (Moral 
Fiction:76).
It seems clear from such critiques that Gardner has a specific ontology o f his 
own. Yet, he is less clear about his gods than he is about the necessity o f belief. 
Like William James, Gardner seems unsure o f  the reality o f free will, but he is 
clearly convinced that not believing in its reality is less usefUl than believing. 
In On Moral Fiction, Gardner appears to cling stubbornly to the necessity of 
b e lie f -  i f  in nothing else, in the power o f  art:
The art which tends towards destruction, the art of the nihilists [and] cynics,
... is not properly art at all. Art is essentially serious and beneficial, a game 
played against chaos and death, against entropy. It is a tragic game, for those 
who have the wit to take it seriously, because our side must lose; a comic 
game -  or so a troll might say -  because only a clown with sawdust brains 
would take our side and eagerly join in (Gardner, 1978:6).
According to Gardner, the practical necessity o f  belief itself warrants our faith. 
If Gardner appears to believe that anything be true, it would seem to be that, 
simply, humanity must believe or else die.
One more substantive reason exists for Gardner’s distaste for characters who 
lack free will -  and “the stranger comes to town” formula. In an early 
discussion in The Art o f  Fiction (1984), Gardner argues that those who are 
serious about writing need to be very serious about education. Education, he 
claims, functions in such a way as to teach us the other side o f  our own 
arguments, thereby helping us realize the dignity and worth o f those we might 
consider enemies.
He then goes on to use Steinbeck’s The Grapes o f  Wrath as an example o f  a 
book which has a potential it never reaches. Gardner claims Steinbeck knew all 
there was to know about the Oklahoma farmers and their new lives in 
California, but
... he knew nothing at all of the California ranchers who employed and 
exploited them; he had no clue to, or interest in, their reasons for behaving as 
they did, and the result is that Steinbeck wrote not a great and firm novel but 
a disappointing melodrama in which complex good is pitted against 
unmitigated, unbelievable evil (Gardner, 1984:10).
Gardner claims Steinbeck did not care about the characters on the other side of 
the argument, did not understand the story that the ranchers would have told,
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because he did not want to hear it. He knew the Okies, and he understood 
them; but he never knew the ranchers. Gardner implies that to Steinbeck the 
actual ranchers were stock figures o f  evil. Because he failed to see them as 
human beings, the ranchers in the novel are not human, making the novel less a 
work o f  art.
Gardner’s point is that any writer’s ability to create human characters is 
dependent upon the degree o f concern and care which he or she has for them. 
In On becoming a novelist, he explains what he sees as the psychological 
requirements for being a writer:
To be psychologically suited for membership in what I have called the 
highest class of novelists, the writer must be not only capable of under­
standing people different from himself but fascinated by such people. He 
must have sufficient self-esteem that he is not threatened by difference, and 
sufficient warmth and sympathy, and a sufficient concern with fairness, that 
he wants to value people different from himself, and finally, he must have, I 
think, sufficient faith in the goodness of life that he can not only tolerate but 
celebrate a world of differences, conflicts, and oppositions (Gardner, 
1983:32).
Few writers have ever embodied that kind o f  care as fully as Chaucer, according 
to Gardner. “I think a good artist has to be fair in all his characters. He has to 
be a generous human being, and Chaucer o f  course is the absolute model o f  it” 
(Mendez-Egle, 1983:104).
Gardner’s Bread Loaf plot distinctions, thus, follow clearly from his basic 
assertions about the way which fiction, and art itself, operate. According to 
him, characters can be truly human only when they have goals (“a man goes on 
a trip”), when they act through choice. The source o f  that choice-making is 
inherent in the writing process, a process through which the writer’s own 
imagination discovers options and chances and thereby endows the characters 
with will. When characters have the morality o f choice-making, Gardner 
claims, they have the humanness which readers want to discover in fiction.
On the other hand, if  the writing process itself does not allow for discovery on 
the part o f the writer, his or her characters will lack the morality o f choice and 
readers will not find themselves drawn to those characters. “Insofar as we’re 
unable to care about the characters,” he says in On Moral Fiction, “we can 
work up no interest in the issues; or if  we do care about the ideas, it is only 
because we accept the writer’s value judgments” (73).
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3.3 The morality of choice
For Gardner, it is the morality o f  choice, implicit in the process o f  writing and 
thereby manifest in the lives o f  fictional characters, which makes stories both 
good and lasting. “A man goes on a trip” is a formula for a character which is 
naturally superior to “a stranger comes to town,” because a character with a 
goal is, according to Gardner, the character whose humanity can and will be 
verified in the creative process undertaken by the writer, and, as a result, by the 
reader as well.
Those o f  you who know anything at all about literary theory will recognize that 
there is nothing at all new in Gardner’s ideas about the place and task of 
imaginative writing; they belong to Aristotle and Sydney, and they likely 
belonged to just about everybody up until the Modern Age. Whatever their 
origins, I find his distinctions helpful in describing the writer’s task, his or her 
obligation to choice, and thereby, to hope, in today’s world. Furthermore, I find 
that his commitment to accuracy, to felt life, to be the most important 
characteristic o f  literature itself. I find him an inspiration in the process o f  my 
own work.
I sometimes wonder if  there really is such a thing as the “Christian 
perspective”: perhaps it can only be some vague and nebulous inspiration. 
Perhaps all the Lord requires o f  us is that, in whatever our fields, we continue 
to ask the question -  how does my work stand as a revelation o f  my faith in the 
Almighty? Although there may be no single answer, that fact does not absolve 
us o f  continuing to ask the question.
For the time being, I like Gardner. And what has he taught me? Simply, this. 
That morality in fiction does not reside in the prescription o f a certain way of 
living or the prohibition o f  certain words and scenes. It resides primarily in 
accuracy, the “felt life” o f  characters whose existence appears on the page, 
created there, as if  by magic, by the process o f  writing itself, characters fully 
human. Christian writers cannot settle for characters whose attributes, dialogue, 
reactions to events appear any more or less than human.
And what do we mean by human? Simply, characters endowed, as all o f  us are, 
with the capability o f  choice. M oral fiction, by Gardner’s definition, is fiction 
which is true to what we know to be human -  true specifically, he says, to our 
capacity for decision-making. We all make choices, and therein, Gardner 
argues, lies our essential humanness. W hen stories are true to that humanness, 
they are truly moral stories.
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4. One Christian’s response
Let me try to make one adjustment to the Gardner thesis, an adjustment which 
grows, I believe, from my own commitment to truth as it bases itself in a 
Christian world view. The summary o f God’s law draws us to our 
responsibilities as believers: to love God above all, and our neighbours as 
ourselves. Love for neighbour, in my mind, necessitates a writer’s creating 
characters true to our view o f man as both a fallen creature, subject to taking 
wrong paths when options present themselves, yet capable at the same time of 
great heroism, stamped eternally, as we are, with the image o f God. To be 
human is to carry both darkness and light. W riting which is moral, to my 
mind, is writing which never fails to establish that seeming paradox, which 
often exhibits itself through the tumbling nuance o f  our own lives.
Recently, the newspapers I read reported the murder o f two old women by a 
gang o f  thugs -  two men, one 68 and the other 34, and two young women, their 
girlfriends, less than half their ages: one twenty and the other 16. With 
graphic intensity, these horrible murders demonstrate the darkness o f  the 
human heart. The victims, both in their 80s, were abducted, bludgeoned, and 
left to die simply because one o f  them criticized the gang’s lifestyle.
The leader o f  the murderous pack, when interrogated after his arrest, swore 
viciously that both o f the victims died at his hands alone, even though 
investigators later determined all o f  them participated. He tried to take the 
blame him self and keep the others from suffering punishments. Certainly, 
there is nothing saintly about anything connected with this horrifying tale, but 
even in its obdurate evil, there is some remnant vestige o f selflessness in the 
murderer’s choice to relieve the others o f  the burden o f their punishments; he 
was, in his own perverse way, showing a kind o f virtue. W riters who can 
capture both our sin and our saintliness capture, I think, the essentials of 
human nature, create memorable characters thereby, and write what I think of 
as truly moral fiction.
5. Conclusion
Finally, let me venture with some trepidation into areas far more yours than 
mine. I have been reading some South African literature for the past few weeks 
in an effort to understand something o f  South African life, since I believe 
literature’s felt life offers us the best means by which experience a world other 
than one’s own. And I have found in both Nadine Gordimer and J.M. Coetzee 
what I consider to be good examples o f  what Gardner would call “moral 
literature”.
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I don’t know South Africa’s critical estimation o f Gordimer’s recent None to 
Accompany M e, but the novel strikes me as the harrowing tale o f Vera Stark, a 
woman who makes a significant choice early in life -  to take a lover while her 
husband is away in the military -  and suffers the ramifications o f  that choice for 
the remainder o f  her life, even though her days offer some joy and even 
blessing. What the novel clearly suggests, it seems to me, is that actions have 
consequences, significant consequences she lacked vision to foresee. The novel 
is certainly no Sunday School lesson -  its backdrop o f the changing nature of 
society in South Africa is instructive (or at least was for me) and multi-faceted: 
the increasing alienation between Sibongile and Didymus Maqoma, resistance 
fighters in exile whose roles have changed radically as the new society is 
emerging, is real and poignant, Gordimer emphasizing the otherwise unseen 
human ramifications o f  the political struggle. Their daughter’s sad lack of 
identity, a result, in part, o f  her European acculturation while her parents were 
in exile, may well be the most terrifying aspect o f  the novel, although Vera 
Stark’s grandson offers no greater sense o f  hope. These characters are simply 
not the one-dimensional stick men which have come to characterize American 
media coverage o f South African political struggles. If all politics is personal, 
as some would have us believe, then the greatest political battles both Vera 
Stark and the Maqomas face are struggles fought on the terrain o f their own 
hearts. Gordimer’s characters are, at least by my estimation, fully human, their 
lives characterized by choices they made or make humanly. This is, I believe, 
moral fiction -  not because good triumphs over evil, but because the characters 
Gordimer has cast are true to what we know to be true even about ourselves.
W riting which is moral, to my mind, is true to what Gardner would call the 
kind o f  choice-making inherent in the human character. That kind o f fiction, it 
seems to me, glorifies the Creator who fashioned us from the breath o f  his own 
nostrils; by necessity such writing identifies clearly the nature o f  our fallenness, 
as well as the triumphs we reach as image-bearers o f  the Creator o f  the 
Universe.
There lies my own fictional creed.
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